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Russian and Norwegian petroleum 
strategies in the Barents Sea1
Arild Moe, Fridtjof Nansen Institute
Abstract: Norway and Russia are both moving petroleum activities into the 
Barents Sea. The Norwegian activities have been characterized by an  industry 
 eager to participate, but ready to withdraw in adverse commercial conditions, 
and authorities supporting enterprise, whilst imposing strong restrictions. 
Russia still does not have a coherent policy for offshore development. The pri-
oritization of state goals is unresolved, and the division of functions between 
state organs and state companies unclear. Private and foreign interests are kept 
at arm’s length. There is still great uncertainty regarding the timing and pace 
of development, as well as the development concepts involved. The relationship 
between Russia and Norway in the energy sphere has been peaceful and co-
operative, despite the jurisdictional dispute in the Barents Sea. The prelimi-
nary delimitation agreement improves the atmosphere further, and means that 
a promising area could be opened for petroleum activities and possibly joint 
exploration of deposits crossing the new boundary line.
Keywords: Barents Sea, Norway, Russia, Boundary delimitation
1.  Norway and Russia in the global energy economy
Norway has emerged as a major oil and gas producer since production on the 
continental shelf commenced in the early 1970s in the North Sea. In 2008 Norway 
was the world’s fifth largest net exporter of crude oil. It has also become a major 
supplier of natural gas in Europe, covering between 20 and 30 per cent of total 
1. This article is a product of the research project “RussCasp – Russian and Caspian energy de-
velopments”, financed by the Petrosam program of the Research Council of Norway. www.
fni.no/russcasp/
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consumption in Germany, the UK, and France. Fields on the Norwegian conti-
nental shelf are connected with terminals on the European continent and Great 
Britain by several pipelines.
Russia is the world’s largest oil producer, and presently second largest gas 
 producer, by far the largest natural gas exporter and second largest oil exporter. 
Russia supplies 28 per cent of oil and gas consumed in the European Union. The 
dominant production areas are in north-western Siberia. Russian petroleum pro-
duction is almost exclusively onshore.
Norway and Russia are both moving petroleum activities into the Barents Sea. 
What are the driving forces and what characterizes their efforts? How will the 
relationship between the two countries evolve? Will development of petroleum 
activities in the Barents Sea open for conflict or co-operation?
2. Exploration of the Barents Sea
2.1 Norway
Most Norwegian production takes place in the North Sea, where oil output is now 
falling. During the past decade, the biggest contribution to new resources has come 
from the Norwegian Sea, off the midsection of the coast of Norway. For future 
production, the focus will increasingly be on the northern part of the continental 
shelf, the Barents Sea. When output from existing gas fields in the south starts 
declining, an extension of the pipeline network northwards is conceivable, to fill 
free capacity in North Sea pipelines with Barents Sea gas.
Norway was initially reluctant to start exploration activities in the High North 
for two main reasons. First, as a newcomer to the petroleum industry, the nation 
had plenty to do further south, but also the relationship with the Soviet Union 
played a part. The USSR signaled that it did not want to see international oil com-
panies in the Barents Sea, and Norwegian plans took this into consideration by 
prescribing dominance of Norwegian companies. However, this line of policy was 
abandoned in the early 1980s and the ‘big majors’ were invited to apply for explora-
tion licenses.2 In the mid 1980s there was widespread optimism about the resource 
potential of the Norwegian Barents Sea, and a surge in activity was expected. The 
results of the exploration effort were not very impressive, however, and at times 
the oil companies were ready to give up the region. Industry interest is of course 
not only determined by perception of the resource potential, but also very much 
by the oil price, available acreage elsewhere, and technological developments.
2.  Tamnes, Rolf, Oljealder 1965–1995 – Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie bind 6, Universitets-
forlaget, Oslo, pp. 323–324.
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Map 1: The Norwegian continental shelf
Several minor discoveries have been made, but only one, the gas field Snøhvit 
(Snow White) discovered in 1984, has been developed so far. The second substantial 
discovery, the Goliat oil field, was made in 2000 by Agip. Exploration activity in 
the Barents Sea has not been very intensive, however, with only some 70 explora-
tion wells drilled as of 2009. The same year mean size of expected undiscovered 
recoverable petroleum resources in the undisputed Norwegian part of the Barents 
Sea was 910 bn scm o.e. (billion standard cubic meters oil equivalent) equal to 764 
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mtoe (million tons of oil equivalents), slightly more gas than oil.3 The estimated 
undiscovered volumes in the North Sea and Norwegian Sea are about the same, but 
those parts of the Norwegian continental shelf have much larger proven reserves, 
though. The degree of uncertainty in the Barents Sea is high since there has been 
no drilling in large areas.
Not only the oil industry, but the Norwegian government as well has been 
uncertain about the path forward. Possible conflicts with fisheries’ interests and 
environmental issues have loomed large in the internal debate, whereas regional 
development has been an argument for increased activity. By 2001 the heated 
 debate led the government to temporarily ban all new exploration licensing in the 
area. Then the ban was partly lifted in 2003, and a series of blocks were licensed 
in three rounds from 2003 to 2009. Clearly the government wanted to increase 
activity, balancing environmental and economic considerations (see below). From 
time to time oil industry representatives argue that the self-imposed area restric-
tions must be lifted. But so far new activity in the 50 km zone from the coastal 
baseline of Norway’s two northernmost counties, Troms and Finnmark, has been 
ruled out. The political compromise established through the adoption of the inte-
grated management plan for the Barents Sea (see below) calls for a re-assessment 
of  exploration activities in 2010. This is a very controversial issue within the red-
green coalition government.
But despite restrictions a considerable increase in interest from the industry 
was also registered and several companies applied for licenses. Nevertheless, 
StatoilHydro, who was the operator for most of the wells planned for 2007-2008, 
declared that results in 2008 would be pivotal for continued exploration efforts 
in the areas so far opened for the industry.4 Again uncertainty regarding future 
industry interest in the area was demonstrated.
As it turned out, the results in 2007 and 2008 were modest, but not completely 
discouraging. In 2007 one discovery was made in the Barents Sea, and in 2008 
another four. None of the discoveries were deemed commercially interesting in 
themselves, but the fact that both oil and gas were found in the explored blocks 
gave hope for other, larger discoveries later on.5 In 2009 the Ministry of Petroleum 
and Energy awarded another 12 production licenses in the Barents Sea in the 20th 
licensing round6 and invited oil companies to apply for licenses in so-called pre-
3. Petroleum resources on the Norwegian continental shelf 2009, Norwegian Petroleum Directo-
rate, 2009, p. 38.
4.  PETRO & Industri, 5–2007.
5.  “Fortsatt tro på Barentshavet” (Still belief in the Barents Sea), Petro.no, 25 May 2009.
6.  Press release 30 April 2009 from the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy.
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determined areas.7 The purpose of awarding such licenses was to ‘prove resources 
close to planned and existing infrastructures’.8 Furthermore, the Ministry has 
invited oil companies to nominate blocks for a 21st licensing round in 2010, also 
including the Barents Sea.9
The latest decisions indicate that authorities perceive sufficient interest from the 
oil industry to go forward with exploration in the Barents Sea. At the same time 
there is a growing consensus that large discoveries are not very likely. Several small 
finds is seen as most probable. To make such finds commercially viable will require 
coordinated development of infrastructure as well as resources.
The first field in the Barents Sea to come on stream was Snøhvit in the fall of 
2007, the first large liquefied natural gas (LNG) project in Europe. The field is 
 located 140 km from shore north-west of Hammerfest in Norway’s northernmost 
county, Finnmark. The development of the project was stopped several times when 
the market outlook was not deemed promising. Only after 2000, with positive 
 expectations in the US market, and only after tax concessions, did it go ahead. It 
was still a difficult birth, involving commercial uncertainty and cost overruns. 
After starting, it experienced serious technical problems.10 The field, with recover-
able reserves of 161 bn scm and 18 mill. scm condensate, has been developed with 
sub-sea installations at water depths of about 300 m. The gas is piped to shore, 
where a processing plant has been built. From there the gas is shipped as LNG in 
special carriers to market.11 The field is slated to produce approximately 6 bcm an-
nually. Of this, 2.6 bn scm has been contracted by Statoil for the US market and 
1.6 for Spain, whereas 1.7 bn scm will be sold by the other main partners, Total 
and GDF Suez.
This is a very advanced and vast project for the sparsely-populated Finnmark 
County. But in addition, the fact that the fundamental infrastructure is in place 
makes smaller, adjacent discoveries more interesting to develop. The same is true 
for discoveries near the Goliat oil field, like Nucula and Tornerose. The plan for 
development and operation (PDO) of Goliat was approved by the Norwegian 
7.  Awards in predefined areas 2009 (APA 2009) – announcement, Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate, 9 March, 2009, http://www.npd.no/en/Topics/Production-licences/Theme-
articles/Licensing-rounds/APA-2009/APA-2009---announcement/.
8.  Petroleum resources on the Norwegian continental shelf 2009, Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate, 2009, p. 29.
9.  Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Press release, 5 November 2009.
10.  “Statoil on course with Snohvit LNG”, Upstreamonline.com, 19 April 2010.
11.  Facts – the Norwegian Petroleum Sector 2009, Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and 
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2009 pp. 138–139.
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Parliament on 19 June 2009. The field is estimated to contain some 174 million 
barrels, or 23.2 million tons of recoverable oil.12
In summary, the Norwegian exploration effort in the Barents Sea is character-
ized by an industry eager to participate, but also ready to withdraw should pre-
vailing conditions so dictate, and authorities supporting development, but also 
imposing strong restrictions.
2.2 Russia
The Soviet Union began seismic surveying of the Barents Sea in the 1970s. In the 
1980s a systematic exploration effort took place revealing gas fields in the ‘super-
giant’ category in the north-western part of the Russian Barents Sea. In the south-
eastern part, usually referred to as the Pechora Sea, a number of promising struc-
tures were identified and some smaller oil fields discovered. In the 1990s explora-
tion activity fell drastically, for financial and organizational reasons. Altogether 
only about 60 wells have been drilled in the whole Russian Barents Sea, but the 
discovery rate has been very high. The basis for a further concentrated exploration 
effort as well as industrial development is more promising than on the Norwegian 
side. In all 11 discoveries in the Russian Barents Sea are now designated as ‘fields,’ 
meaning that resources are expected to be recoverable: 4 oil fields, 1 oil and con-
densate field, 3 gas and condensate fields, and 3 gas fields.13 According to Russian 
estimates, there are some 3,700 mtoe of recoverable resources in the structures 
which have been studied in detail.14 This is more than remaining reserves15 on the 
entire Norwegian continental shelf. Natural gas is predominant, but there are also 
sizeable oil resources. Although considerable uncertainty attends the Russian esti-
mates, there is little doubt that the resource potential is very substantial. However, 
more exploration drilling is needed before development can start.
Despite these promising perspectives the activity level in the Russian Barents 
Sea has remained low. A half-hearted and limited licensing round was carried 
12.  “Norwegian shelf, 2nd quarter 2009”, Press Release 47/2009, 21 July 2009, Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate, http://www.npd.no/en/news/news/2009/norwegian-shelf-2nd-quar-
ter-2009/.
13.  “Mineral’nye resursy rossiyskogo shel’fa”, Mineral’nye resursy Rossii –Ekonomika i uprevale-
nie, Special edition, 2006 p. 16.
14.  Ibid. p. 18.
15.  Note that these reserve/resource classifications are not directly comparable. (Norwegian) 
‘remaining reserves’ constitute a more strictly defined category than Russian ‘recoverable 
resources’.
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out in 1999, but attracted little interest.16 Presently four Russian companies have 
ongoing exploration activities in the Barents Sea. Plans for a new comprehensive 
exploration programme organized as a series of licensing rounds, were presented 
in 2001 and were reiterated as late as 2006, but there has been no announcement 
of a new round. There are several reasons for this slowness: The Russian petroleum 
industry has had many options onshore, besides having little or no offshore expe-
rience, and has not pressed for a more vigorous offshore programme; the military 
has been a brake, but probably less so now than earlier; the authorities have wanted 
Russian companies to be in control, but the companies have not been ready. It is 
also evident that the legal and tax framework has been insufficient to make risky 
offshore operations attractive.
Over the last four-five years the prominence of offshore development has 
 increased considerably in speeches made by Russian officials. Partly this is con-
nected to a growing realization that Russia may face a problem getting enough 
fields on stream to keep up output, despite a huge resource base. The increased pri-
ority given to offshore has led to improvement in the legal framework and tax rules. 
But these developments have been overshadowed by the new legislation on foreign 
investment in strategic sectors that was adopted in April 2008, and accompany-
ing changes in other laws, notably the law on mineral resources. All the resources 
on the Russian continental shelf were declared to be of ‘federal significance’. The 
continental shelf would be reserved for state companies with at least five years ex-
perience from work on the continental shelf – in practice Rosneft’ and Gazprom.17 
This does not preclude joint projects with foreign companies, as long as the license 
remains with the Russian party. But the whole governance of the offshore sector 
must now be questioned. Through the new legislation the authorities have ceded 
the initiative to the two companies and an assessment of the outlook for further 
petroleum development in the Russian Barents Sea must therefore, more than 
ever before, take into consideration the strategies and interests of Gazprom and 
Rosneft’. It can be questioned whether Arctic offshore development has the same 
16.  Moe, Arild and Anne Kristin Jørgensen, “Offshore Mineral Development in the Russian 
Barents Sea” in Post Soviet Geography and Economics, (41) 2000, pp. 98–133.
17.  It is possible though that new players will emerge. The state owned oil company Zarubezhneft’ 
that was set up in Soviet times to work in projects abroad and mainly has been active in 
a Russian–Vietnamese joint venture, has started activities in Russia. In April 2010 it was 
announced that it is taking over Arktikmorneftegazrazvedka, the drilling organization in 
Murmansk controlling most of the exploration rigs. Kommersant, 28 April, 2010.
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urgency for these two companies as it seems to have for the Russian state.18 The 
Deputy Minister of Natural Resources voiced his frustration in the Duma by refer-
ring to the limited investments offshore by Rosneft’ and Gazprom in 2008 (a year 
when in fact their offshore investments were higher than ever): “By maintaining 
such levels it will require 155 years to reach the necessary amount of investments”.19
Increasing emphasis on use of Russian companies and equipment also seems to 
be irreconcilable with rapid development, since the oil industry lacks experience 
and the shipbuilding industry has serious problems. According to official Russian 
documents “Russian civilian shipbuilding is of a non-specialized nature … and is 
carried out with outdated means of production”. It is also admitted that Russian 
yards do not have the scale and are not equipped to handle civilian customers.20
Summing up, it is evident that Russia still does not have a coherent policy for 
further offshore developments. The prioritization of state goals is unresolved, and 
the division of functions between state organs and state companies unclear. Private 
and foreign interests are kept at arm’s length. A new state programme for explora-
tion and development of the continental shelf is promised in 2010, but it remains 
to be seen whether such a document can resolve the contradictions. There is still 
great uncertainty regarding the timing and pace of development, as well as the 
development concepts involved.
2.3 Shtokman
Russia’s Shtokman gas and condensate field, located 650 km north-east of 
Murmansk city and 540 km from shore is one of the largest offshore gas fields 
in the world, with reserves of 3,800 bcm.21 Again the precise comparison with 
Norwegian reserve numbers is difficult, since the Russian number reflects the 
reserve category C1 – test-drilled (evaluated reserves) which in other cases have 
18.  For more on Russian offshore strategies see Moe, Arild and Elana Wilson Rowe, “Northern 
Offshore Oil and Gas Resources: Policy challenges and approaches”, in Elana Wilson Rowe 
(ed.) Russia and the North, University of Ottawa Press, Ottawa 2009, pp. 107–128.
19.  Ministry of Natural Resources, Press release, 24 June, 2009.
20.  Federal’naya tselevaya programma ‘Razvitie grazhdanskoy morskoy tekhniki na 2009–2016 
gody’ (Federal target programme ‘Development of civilian marine engineering for the pe-
riod 2009–2016’) Confirmed by Government resolution No. 103, 21 February, 2008, quoted 
and discussed in Moe, Arild and Lars Rowe, “Petroleum Activity in the Russian Barents Sea: 
Constraints and Options for Norwegian Offshore and Shipping Companies”, FNI Report 
7/2008, Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Lysaker 2008.
21.  http://www.gazprom.ru. Bcm – billion cubic metres – are used here when referring to Russian 
data. Note that a Russian cubic meter is measured differently than a standard cubic meter, the 
measurement used on e.g. the Norwegian continental shelf. Russian figures must be multiplied 
by 0.91 to get the equivalent in standard cubic meters.
russian and norwegian petroleum strategies in the barents sea
233
turned out to be overstated, but clearly the field is more than twice as big as the 
Troll field in the North Sea, currently the biggest producing offshore gas field in 
the world. Shtokman also contains condensate, 53 mill. tons, something which 
enhances its commercial attraction.
The Shtokman field was discovered in 1988 and in the period 1990–96 seven 
exploration wells were drilled. Various international co-operation schemes for 
 development of the field have been discussed over the years, but the Russian license 
holder Gazprom (through subsidiaries) only became committed after 2003 when 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) gained prominence in the company’s strategy, particu-
larly directed towards the US market. In addition, technological breakthroughs 
made development of the field and the world’s biggest LNG project more feasible. 
Gazprom announced that it would develop the field in a consortium with foreign 
companies, and most large international companies showed interest. In 2005 five 
companies were shortlisted: Chevron, ConocoPhillips, Total, Statoil and Norsk 
Hydro. Plans were changed, however, when in October 2006 Gazprom declared 
that foreign part-ownership was out of the question and that the field would be 
developed by Gazprom itself, with the help of foreign technology providers and 
possibly international oil companies in assisting roles.22
But this position too was soon abandoned, and in 2007 a new collaborative 
model was launched. For the first phase of development, a special-purpose com-
pany, Shtokman Development AG, was established, together with Total and the 
now merged StatoilHydro. The foreign companies hold 25 and 24 per cent respec-
tively, whereas the majority, 51 per cent, rests with Gazprom. The special-purpose 
company will develop and operate about one third of the field. It will own the 
infrastructure for 25 years after production start-up, at which point everything 
will be handed over to Gazprom. Shtokman Development AG is not to sell the gas. 
This will be done by Gazprom, and the license remains with Gazprom’s subsidiary 
which was renamed Gazprom neft’ shel’ f. The exact contractual conditions are not 
public and may be finally settled only in the course of 2010.
The full development of Shtokman is currently envisaged in three stages, each 
producing up to 23.7 bcm per year, to commence at four-year intervals. Gazprom 
has already started planning the second phase itself and has created a new fully-
owned subsidiary, Gazprom dobycha shel’ f, for that purpose. According to pre-
sent plans, peak production of 71.1 bcm per year will be reached after 25 years. 
Altogether the field is scheduled to produce for 50 years. There are, however, ex-
22.  For an analysis of this decision see Moe, Arild, “Sjtokman-beslutningen: Forklaringer og imp-
likasjoner” (‘The Shtokman Decision: Explanations and Implications’), Nordisk Østforum, 
(20) 2006, pp. 389–403.
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pectations that it will be possible to have a fourth development phase, bringing 
peak production up to 95 bcm.23
When ‘New Shtokman’ was launched in 2007 there was not an agreed overall 
technical solution for the field, and the challenges are substantial, as distance to 
shore, drifting ice, and high waves all pose problems. Statoil and Hydro had sepa-
rately and together argued for a pure subsea solution, referring to their experience 
from Snøhvit and Ormen Lange. Gazprom, it seems, found such a solution too 
risky, and favored a more conventional solution with one or two platforms. The 
solution arrived at is a kind of compromise: Subsea installations connected to a 
floating platform.
The initial plans for the first phase indicated that half of the output would be 
transported by a new pipeline linked to the North Stream pipeline under the Baltic 
Sea to Germany. Some gas would be used for local needs along the pipeline. The 
other half would be liquefied in the LNG plant to be constructed at Teriberka on the 
Kola Peninsula. The annual output of LNG would be 7.5 mill. destined for “coun-
tries in the Atlantic basin”. For the total field development, one third of output 
was considered for liquefaction. This would amount to 30 mill. tons of LNG per 
year at peak production from the field.24 The official goal was originally to start 
deliveries of piped gas in 2013 and LNG in 2014, but the practicality of that time 
frame was questioned by many, referring to time required for the construction of 
installations, but also to the time needed for drilling.
It was first announced that Shtokman Development would decide in late 2009 
whether to go ahead with investments. This date was then moved to the first half 
of 2010 and later it was signaled that the decision would be made in the course of 
2010. To make a decision SDAG would need to have the results from the design 
studies that were commissioned in 2008-2009 and probably also concrete offers 
for part of the development, making it possible to calculate costs.
2.4 Prirazlomnoye
The largest field identified in the Pechora Sea is Prirazlomnoye, located 57 km 
offshore from Varandey, at a depth of 20 meters. Since drilling started in 1989, 
four wells have been completed. The exploitable reserves have in recent years been 
adjusted radically downwards and are by 2010 estimated to be 46,4 million tons, 
sufficient to support an annual output of 6 million tons. The Rosshel’ f consor-
23.  “Shtokman ostaetsya rossiyskim proektom”, Gazprom, 3, 2008. Interview with Yuri Komarov, 
General director of Shtokman Development AG.
24.  Ibid.
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tium25 received a license for development of the field in 1993; construction of the 
Prirazlomnaya platform at the Sevmash shipyard in Severodvinsk was scheduled 
to take three years, starting in 1995. The platform is a huge steel caisson to be 
placed on the shallow ocean floor, more like an artificial island. It will contain 
production and storage facilities and protect the installation from the severe ice 
problems in the area.
However, problems soon emerged, and the construction process came to a com-
plete standstill several times. In addition to direct technical problems, constant 
changes in the design have been a major reason for delays. It also proved difficult to 
attract sufficient financial resources. Several foreign partners have been in and out 
of the project, including the Australian oil company BHP, the International Finance 
Corporation (under the World Bank) and the German  company Wintershall AG. 
Other companies have been approached to take part in the project – in 2003 no-
tably Norsk Hydro – but they have declined, finding the project too risky and/or 
not commercially attractive.
In 2002 the license was transferred to Sevmorneftegaz, initially owned jointly by 
Gazprom and Rosneft’.26 It was decided to abandon the original idea of building a 
complete platform in Severodvinsk. Instead a discarded platform from the North 
Sea – Hutton TLP – was purchased and the topside transported to Severodvinsk 
for installation on the caisson. The used platform proved to be a disaster, however, 
and there is very little of this purchase that will eventually be used. The new topside 
currently being built consists solely of imported equipment.27 A new agreement 
covering all aspects of finalization of the platform as well as its installation on 
the continental shelf was signed in August 200828 and in 2009 Gazprom officially 
 declared start-up for oil production at Prirazlomnoye to be 2010.29 But this dead-
line too will be broken.
25.  Rosshel’f gradually became dominated by Gazprom, but had various organizations with am-
bitions in the offshore sector as shareholders, notably Sevmash. For an analysis of this early 
phase see Moe, Arild, “Oil and Gas: Future Role of the Barents Region”, in Olav S. Stokke and 
Ola Tunander (eds.) The Barents Region: Cooperation in Arctic Europe, Sage, London 1994 pp. 
131–144.
26.  Sevmorneftegaz was established as a joint company between Gazprom and Rosneft’ in 2002 
and took over the licenses for Shtokman and Prirazlomnoye. In 2004 Rosneft’ sold its share 
and Sevmorneftegaz, as a fully-owned subsidiary, then became the offshore development 
division of Gazprom. In 2008 it was renamed Gazprom neft’ shel’f and given a more limited 
role.
27.  ‘Gazprom inspektiruet stroitelstvo platformy’. Press release from Sevmash, 25 April 2008.
28.  Press release from Sevmash, 4 August 2008.
29.  Gazprom v tsifrakh 2004–2008, Moscow: Gazprom, 2009.
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All in all the experience from Prirazlomnoye has not been encouraging, but 
some lessons have been learnt. The development has taken longer and has proven 
more costly than expected. Plans for using almost exclusively Russian equipment 
had to be abandoned. There is, however, widespread belief that the field will start 
producing in a few years; and with the large platform in place as a hub, develop-
ment of other smaller fields in the vicinity will become more attractive.
3. Environmental and resource management concerns
The vulnerability of the northern environment is a central issue in Norwegian 
thinking about the High North. Environmental concerns include the preservation 
of wildlife and biodiversity as well as the pristine natural surroundings, but they 
are also connected to specific economic interests: fisheries. The Barents Sea is one 
of the most bio-productive seas in the world, and has very rich fishing grounds, 
especially for the highly-valued cod. Environmental and fisheries’ interests fear 
that pollution and spills related to petroleum activities will have a serious negative 
effect on biodiversity and fish resources, and may reduce catches or lower the value 
of fish from the Barents Sea. These fears are substantiated by results from marine 
research institutions and experience from elsewhere in the world.
For these reasons, Norway has proceeded cautiously in developing its hydro-
carbon resources in the North. Concern for the environment and for the possible 
impact on fisheries has limited the scope of exploration – both in terms of spa-
tial extent and time periods. When the Barents Sea shelf was re-opened in 2003 
after the halt in exploration in 2001, the “zero-discharge principle” was applied, 
requiring minimization of operational discharges. There is a continuing heated 
debate about which areas shall be opened for exploration and development. Stricter 
 environmental regulations than elsewhere on the Norwegian continental shelf are 
applied in those areas where petroleum activity is allowed.
The Russian Federation has many of the same interests as Norway with regard 
to protection of the environment and resources in the North, and has officially 
 acknowledged the importance of environmental considerations. There are, how-
ever, fundamental differences in the attitudes to environmental challenges.
The Norwegian approach is dominated by the precautionary principle: What 
can be done to prevent possible problems? The debate in Norway has to a large 
extent been revolving around hypothetical situations. There have been very few 
 actual environmental problems with the activity carried out. On the Russian side 
the attitude is different. The focus is on the actual situation – and also on experi-
ences from elsewhere. As long as concrete problems have not been identified, like 
major discharges, it is difficult to turn the attention to possible future problems. 
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“Let us wait and see what happens” is a phrase commonly heard. This difference 
in attitude can be given various explanations, but clearly many Russians, research-
ers and ordinary people alike, find it futile to discuss hypothetical environmental 
problems offshore when there are many unsolved environmental issues close at 
hand.
The political processes surrounding environmental policy and regulations 
are also very different between Norway and Russia. Environmental debates are a 
central element in the general political discourse in Norway. In addition, several 
environmental NGOs have a high profile and play an active part. Such organiza-
tions are regarded as legitimate stakeholders, and concern expressed by laymen is 
considered a factor to be addressed. In Russia, there is a much stronger emphasis 
on ‘expert opinion’. There are therefore many fewer legitimate participants in the 
limited ongoing debate. Environmental NGOs active in north-west Russia some-
times are consulted by authorities, if they are considered to possess expertise, but 
generally they are considered amateurs. Also the environmental NGOs themselves 
tend to focus on current, concrete issues, rather than potential future problems.30
Interestingly, the perceived state of environmental affairs on the Russian 
 continental shelf has been used as an argument in favor of increased activity on 
the Norwegian Barents Sea shelf. The reasoning was that Russia was about to start 
large-scale activities in the Barents Sea, and that Norwegian companies should 
be given a go-ahead so they could provide an example potentially for the Russian 
industry to follow.31 Clearly, as argued earlier in this article, the impression of 
haste on the Russian side was exaggerated, and the perception of Russian regula-
tions was superficial.
Environmental impact assessments play a central role in Norwegian petroleum 
policy: first, before decisions are taken about opening new areas for exploration, 
then later before licensing rounds are announced and when concrete projects are 
considered. Russia has a well-established system of environmental impact assess-
ments – OVOS – for all kinds of industrial projects. However, impact assessments 
30.  For an elaboration of Russian attitudes see Hønneland Geir, J. H. Jørgensen and A. Moe, 
“‘Miljøpersepsjoner i Nordvest-Russland: Problemoppfatninger knyttet til petroleumsutbyg-
ging i Barentshavet” (‘Environmental Perceptions in North-Western Russia: Perspectives on 
Petroleum Development in the Barents Sea’) in Internasjonal Politikk, (65) 2007, pp. 7–22.
31.  Jensen, Leif Christian, “Petroleum discourse in the European Arctic: the Norwegian case”, 
Polar Record (43) 2007 pp. 247–254.
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are directed towards the project level, and Russia lacks a more integrated approach 
to strategic planning before individual projects are developed.32
There clearly are conflicts between different arms of the Norwegian government 
regarding offshore development. The Ministry of petroleum and energy is gener-
ally supportive, whereas the Ministry of the environment is more skeptical. The 
government tries to balance concerns and form a coherent policy. An ambitious 
attempt at a concerted policy was the development of a comprehensive plan for 
integrated management of the Barents Sea, finalized in 2006.33 The plan is  intended 
to be in line with international treaties and processes, stressing the need for inte-
grated management of resources and need for environmental considerations in sea 
areas. One of the most politically touchy issues here is the establishment of areas 
with severe restrictions – whether as PSSAs (Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas) ac-
cording to IMO standards and guidelines, or other categories of marine protected 
areas where oil exploration will not be permitted at all. This overall management 
plan is an important determinant for the further opening of new areas for explo-
ration and production.
The Russian environmental authorities are relatively weaker than their coun-
terparts in Norway. The Ministry of Natural Resources (which from spring 2008 
has added ‘Ecology’ to its name), is mainly a structure oriented towards resource 
exploitation. There are agencies under the Ministry set up to monitor and control 
offshore activities. But their political clout is not strong. Environmental policy 
continues to be treated as a sector interest, and is given much less attention at 
the highest political level than is the case in Norway. Another feature of Russian 
policy-making is that issues tend not to be settled, precisely because the govern-
ment does not really integrate and balance all concerns. Infighting continues after 
decisions ostensibly have been made.
In some cases Russian environmental regulations are stricter than in Norway, 
for example, with regard to discharges. But questions have been raised with regard 
to compliance with extensive and complicated Russian laws and regulations. Fines 
imposed on perpetrators are not always high enough to deter offenders.
While Norway cannot directly affect developments on the Russian side, it can 
support improvements in Russian policy and regulations, and this is a declared 
32.  Solodyankina, Svetlana and Johann Koeppel, “The environmental impact assessment process 
for oil and gas extraction projects in the Russian Federation: possibilities for improvement” 
in Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, (27) March 2009 pp. 77–83.
33.  English version can be downloaded from http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/MD/Vedlegg/
Svalbard%20og%20polaromraadene/Forvaltningsplan%20Barentshavet/PDF0080506_en-
gelsk-TS.pdf. Accessed 12 May 2010.
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goal for the Norwegian government.34 There is a long-standing relationship and 
co-operation between Norwegian and Russian environmental authorities, and 
the Russian side has shown interest in adopting elements from the Norwegian 
integrated management plan in the Russian Barents Sea. Increased co-operation 
 between research institutions led to publication of a joint environmental status 
report for the Barents Sea in 2009.35 The next phase might be establishment of com-
mon monitoring systems. But the weakness of Russian environmental authorities 
puts limitations on this effort. The Norwegian dream of developing common prin-
ciples for resource and environmental management for the whole Barents Sea is 
still far from realization, even though the general Russian attitude to co-operation 
on resources management is positive.36
In the Norwegian domestic debate, climate concerns are being used as an argu-
ment against extension of petroleum activities in the North. The reasoning is that 
as rapid climate change in the Arctic is becoming more and more evident, increas-
ing petroleum activity in that region is particularly negative. The government does 
not agree with this and holds that climate change is a global problem, where pro-
duction from the Arctic is no different than oil from other regions. On the other 
hand the almost euphoric statements about the access to new acreage provided by 
the receding ice-cover heard in some international media is almost absent in the 
Norwegian public. This may be explained by a degree of political sensitivity in 
the Norwegian oil industry, but also by the fact that ice has not been a problem in 
the Norwegian Barents Sea south, the area so far opened for commercial activity.
On the Russian side climate change and climate politics are much lower on the 
agenda. Increased open waters are sometimes referred to, but are not a major issue 
in official documents concerning development strategies in the North.
4. Jurisdictional issues
4.1 The disputed area
When developments in the Law of the Sea extended the continental shelves belong-
ing to the coastal states and also gave these states the right to establish exclusive 
economic zones, a large area of overlapping claims between Norway and the Soviet 
34.  Report 1 to the Storting 2009–2010 (The State budget – Ministry of the environment), chapter 10.
35.  “Joint Norwegian-Russian environmental status 2008 Report on the Barents Sea Ecosystem”. 
IMR/PINRO Joint Report Series, 2009.
36.  In a press release from the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources 11 December 2009 after a 
meeting with the state secretary in the Norwegian ministry of petroleum and energy, a series 
of co-operation areas for the near future was listed, including exploration and production of 
hydrocarbons on the Arctic and Barents continental shelf.
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Union emerged in the Barents Sea, since the two countries adhered to different 
principles for delimitation of neighboring shelves and zones. Norway supported 
the equidistance or median-line principle, which defines the border as a line drawn 
an equal distance from the territory of the two states. The Soviet Union and later 
Russia argued for the sector-line, based on a line drawn in the 1920s from the 
mainland border to the North Pole, within which the USSR declared sovereignty 
over all islands. Formal negotiations stated in 1974 over the disputed area, which 
constituted some 175,000 square kilometers.
The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate carried out some seismic surveys in the 
mid 1970s and the Soviet Union did so well into the 1980s.37 After the mid 1980s 
both states practiced a moratorium on exploration in accordance with UNCLOS 
provisions to avoid activities in contested waters. Whereas Norwegian authorities 
wanted as little discussion as possible about anticipated resources, so as not to 
complicate the negotiations, Russian geologists have regularly voiced considerable 
optimism regarding the potential of the area. In recent years reinterpretation of 
old seismic data with new equipment and improved analytical methods seems to 
have reinforced the optimism, and various maps indicating a large gas field in the 
area have been circulated. Russian authorities even published data on “recoverable 
resources” in the disputed area: 520 million tons of oil and 5.9 trillion cubic me-
ters of natural gas.38 But certainty cannot be achieved until drilling is undertaken. 
That has not happened, but an exploration well was drilled by a soviet organization 
more or less on the median line in 1983, creating considerable anxiety in Norway.39
In the negotiations the Russian side repeatedly argued that Norway and Russia 
could establish a co-operative regime for exploitation of hydrocarbon resources 
in the area – before a delimitation line was drawn. The Norwegian position was 
that co-operation in exploration and production could be established only after 
a firm delimitation line had been drawn. These positions were not easy to recon-
cile, but in recent years it seems that the two sides have discussed hypothetical 
co-operation schemes, schemes that could be implemented once a delimitation 
line had been agreed upon.
The unsolved delimitation issue was regarded in Norway as the biggest obstacle 
to bilateral relations with Russia, even if it did not prevent establishment of exten-
sive co-operation in several areas, including petroleum activity. When a resolution 
37.  The scope of the soviet seismic activity is unknown, but Tamnes argues that it continued in 
limited form also after 1985. Tamnes, Rolf, Oljealder 1965–1995 p. 302.
38. Ledovskikh, A.A., “Geopoliticheskie aspekty razvitiya neftegazovogo kompleksa severo-
zapadnogo regiona Rossii”, in Mineral’nye resursy Rossii –Ekonomika i upravlenie, 4, 2005, 
pp. 2–13.
39. Tamnes, Rolf, Oljealder 1965–1995 p. 302.
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to the dispute was found in a preliminary agreement in April 2010, the news was 
met with widespread relief in Norway. The political compromise reached divides 
the area into two approximately even parts (see Map 2).40 In a joint statement 
“a comprehensive Treaty concerning maritime delimitation and co-operation in 
the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean” was envisaged.41 It seems though that this 
is only a political statement signaling positive intentions. Large-scale concrete 
joint activity is so far not in the offing. But the two delegations also “recommend 
the adoption of detailed rules and procedures ensuring efficient and responsible 
management of their hydrocarbon resources in cases where any single oil or gas 
deposit should extend across the delimitation line”.42 It is clearly a necessity to 
40.  The joint statement implicitly refers to the median-line principle but states “In addition to 
the relevant factors identified in this regard in international law, including the effect of major 
disparities in respective coastal lengths, they have taken into account the progress achieved 
in the course of long-standing negotiations between the parties in order to reach agreement.” 
Joint Statement on maritime delimitation and co-operation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic 
Ocean. 27 April 2010. http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Folkerett/030427_
english_4.pdf. Accessed 12 May 2010.
41.  Ibid.
42.  Ibid.
Map 2: Delimitation line and previously disputed area in the Barents Sea.
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establish rules for unitization of fields. Whether unitization will imply parallel 
or joint exploitation will to a large extent depend on economic calculations. Only 
when unitization rules are established and the delimitation line is detailed can the 
delimitation agreement be signed and later presented to the parliaments of the two 
respective countries, and then ratified. 
Resolution of the delimitation dispute means that a promising area could be 
opened for petroleum activities, even though it may take several years before a 
comprehensive exploration effort starts. But it can also be argued that removal 
of the dispute adds stability to the whole region and makes investments more at-
tractive. Norway has an interest in developing advantageous co-operation projects 
with Russia in the area, but will continue to want to see companies from other 
countries active in the region.
4.2 Svalbard
The Svalbard archipelago (Spitsbergen) has been under Norwegian sovereignty 
since the Spitsbergen Treaty of 1920 entered into force. But even though Norway 
was granted ‘full and absolute sovereignty’ over the archipelago, this sovereignty 
came with some qualifications. Norway may not discriminate subjects of other sig-
natories when it comes to most forms of economic activity on the islands,  notably 
exploitation of mineral deposits, nor may Norway profit by imposing higher taxes 
than needed for the administration of the islands.
Whereas the treaty defines the archipelago as the islands within certain geo-
graphical coordinates, it says nothing about the sea areas beyond territorial waters 
or the ocean floor. The reach of the provisions of the Spitsbergen Treaty is a matter 
of controversy. Norway holds that the treaty limitations on its jurisdiction do not 
apply to the continental shelf around Svalbard outside the territorial sea, now 12 
nm, and that the seabed is subject to unrestricted Norwegian jurisdiction.43 Some 
parties to the treaty have reserved themselves against the Norwegian interpreta-
tion. A few have protested, holding that treaty restrictions apply also beyond the 
territorial sea, and that the archipelago has its own continental shelf – to be gov-
43.  For a presentation of the official Norwegian view see: “Svalbard and the Surrounding Maritime 
Areas” by Rolf Einar Fife, Director General, Legal Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/selected-topics/civil--rights/spesiell-folkerett/
folkerettslige-sporsmal-i-tilknytning-ti.html?id=537481. Accessed 12 May 2010.
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erned in the same way as the islands themselves.44 Most of the 39 signatories to 
the Svalbard treaty have not voiced any views on the matter.45
Thus, the disagreement about the regime for the continental shelf around 
Svalbard is not about Norwegian sovereignty, but about the legal basis for that 
sovereignty, the modern law of the sea, providing the coastal state with extensive 
rights, as claimed by Norway, or the Svalbard Treaty, with its provisions limiting 
the exercise of Norwegian jurisdiction, as argued by some other states, includ-
ing Russia.46 The dispute has not become heated since it has remained uncertain 
whether the areas in question have any promising geological structures for oil 
and gas deposits. Little is known, because very limited seismic surveying has been 
carried out.
In addition to surveys carried out under the auspices of the Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate, some seismics have been shot by foreign scientific expe-
ditions. According to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, permission for 
“marine scientific research projects” shall in normal circumstances be granted, “in 
order to increase scientific knowledge of the marine environment for the benefit 
of all mankind”.47 The Norwegian interpretation of the latter clause is that data 
collected should be published or at least made available to Norwegian authorities.
Some attention has been given to a Russian geological company that over several 
years has carried out seismic surveys on the continental shelf around Svalbard on 
behalf of the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources, as part of a broader program 
to study the geology on the northern continental shelves. Norway has granted 
44.  In connection with Norway’s submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf in 2006, only two countries, Russia and particularly Spain, used the opportunity to 
underline that acceptance of the submission did not influence their position on the status of 
the continental shelf around Svalbard. Jensen, Øystein, in Vidas, Davor (ed.) Law, Technology 
and Science for Oceans in Globalisation – IUU Fishing, Oil Pollution, Bioprospecting, Outer 
Continental Shelf, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston 2010, pp. 519–538. See page 
537.
45.  When Norway and Denmark/Greenland concluded an agreement on a maritime boundary 
between Greenland and Svalbard in 2006, the jurisdiction issue was mentioned, but in a very 
neutral way: “This Agreement is without prejudice to the respective Parties’ views on ques-
tions that are not governed by this Agreement, including questions relating to their exercise 
of sovereign rights or jurisdiction over the sea and the sea-bed and its subsoil” (Article 3). 
Quoted in Elferink, Alex G. Oude, “Maritime Delimitation Between Denmark/Greenland 
and Norway” in Ocean Development & International Law, (38) pp. 375–380.
46.  Pedersen, Torbjørn, “The Svalbard continental shelf controversy: Legal disputes and political 
rivalries”, in Ocean Development and International Law, (37) 2006 pp. 339–358.
47.  Article 246, 3rd paragraph. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 
1982. http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_conven-
tion.htm. Accessed 12 May 2010.
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permission for the surveys as ‘scientific research’. The purpose of these expedi-
tions has, however, included the identification of prospective zones for oil and gas 
accumulations, and that could bring them into conflict with the Norwegian ban 
on commercial exploration for petroleum in the area. The Russian company has 
also been reluctant to publish data.48 It is difficult to see, though, that Russia has 
an interest in undermining the Norwegian position with regard to jurisdiction on 
the continental shelf around Svalbard, at least for the time being. If Norway were 
to open the shelf for commercial activities, Russian companies would hardly be 
best positioned to take advantage of such a development, given their inexperience 
in offshore operations.
Even though Norway has found little explicit support for the principle of unre-
stricted Norwegian jurisdiction on the shelf around Svalbard, the alternative – a 
shelf regime based on the Spitsbergen Treaty – would not necessarily be attractive 
for other states, especially if the Mining Code has to be applied. The potential for 
conflict with other parties would make engagement in the area very risky from 
a commercial point of view. What makes the Treaty regime attractive are the lax 
tax rules.
So far Norway has not opened these areas for commercial petroleum explora-
tion – as indicated on Map 1. It remains to be seen if the issue will heat up. Much 
will depend on expectations for the resource potential. If expectations are high, 
pressure on Norway to open the Northern Barents Sea shelf must be expected. 
In practice it is difficult to imagine extensive commercial activities on the shelf 
around Svalbard without Norwegian administration, since it would entail a very 
high risk to operate without some form of regulator. In addition there would be a 
need to establish base facilities on the islands.
5. Conclusions
Initially we posed two questions regarding Russian and Norwegian petroleum 
activities in the Barents Sea:
What are the driving forces and what characterizes their efforts?
How will the relationship between the two countries evolve?
As we have seen there are similarities, but many contrasts as well. The resource 
picture in Norway and Russia differs. Whereas Russia has several unexplored 
 areas, Norway’s options are more limited, as has become increasingly evident 
after 2000. The Norwegian petroleum industry has strongly argued for increased 
activity in the North. On the Russian side, companies have been more reluctant. 
48.  Pedersen 2006 pp. 348–349.
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Both in Norway and in Russia regional interests have generally been positive to-
wards development, but regional concerns loom larger in Norway than in Russia.
Both in Russia and in Norway there are restraining forces, but they are signifi-
cantly different. In Norway environmental considerations have slowed the gen-
eral development and have seriously influenced the organization of activities. In 
contrast, environmental restraints have so far not played any observable role in 
Russia’s policies. This does not mean that the environment is irrelevant. As has 
been shown in other instances, environmental regulations have the potential to 
stop or delay industrial development, but green issues are brought in at a later stage 
in the planning process than in Norway.
There is a discrepancy between Russian policy statements and actual develop-
ment of the offshore hydrocarbon sector. An important reason is competing policy 
goals. Russian companies and suppliers are supposed to play a dominant role in 
the development of offshore resources, but since they are not ready to play that 
role, development is slow.
A major Russian project, Shtokman, has been underway for some time, seem-
ingly undermining the arguments above. But in that case the configuration of 
 interests was different. The main driver for Shtokman development was Gazprom’s 
interest in the LNG market. That interest was shared by foreign companies, in-
cluding Norwegian enterprises. And for this huge project, obviously regarded as 
strategic, the foreign companies were willing to accept a peculiar organizational 
and contract structure, a structure which probably would not be applicable for 
other projects at other times.
Whereas uncertainties relating to costs and time frame were evident from the 
start of the new co-operative venture, market uncertainties took center stage from 
2009. The financial crisis caused a sharp dip in gas demand in Russia’s export mar-
kets, and even more so within Russia, causing a cutback in Russian gas production 
by some 12.4 per cent that year.49 The need to bring in new production capacity for 
the sake of Russia’s gas balance was suddenly less urgent than just a year earlier. 
Nevertheless, this situation need not derail a project which is expected to come on 
stream well after the financial crisis is over and demand has picked up. The more 
serious challenge comes from development of unconventional gas, particularly the 
vast resources of shale gas in the United States, which may drastically change gas 
markets.50 According to some forecasts, the United States, which is a major market 
49.  Kommersant, 12 January 2010. Gazprom’s reduction was 16.1 per cent.
50.  Shale gas is one form of unconventional gas. It is produced from shale with a high content of 
organic material by way of hydraulic fracturing. The reserves have been known and exploited 
for several years, but recent technological developments have led to a radical reassessment of 
the commercial potential.
arild moe
246
for LNG from Shtokman, may not need to import much LNG at all in few years, 
and may in fact become a net exporter.51 Not only Russia, but also other gas pro-
ducers have been developing projects aimed at the US market, projects that cannot 
be stopped since the ‘gas revolution’ has happened so rapidly. There is likely to be 
an oversupply of LNG for some time, not least in the European market, another 
possible destination for Shtokman LNG. Much uncertainty about the cost, timing 
and potential of shale gas persists, but it has undoubtedly affected the outlook for 
Shtokman, and it was specifically referred to the uncertain market outlook when 
Shtokman Development AG on 5 February 2010 announced that the investment 
decision was postponed to 2011.52
The company also announced that it would decide on the pipeline project first 
and then later in 2011 whether to build the LNG plant. Thus a ‘pipeline-only’ 
 solution is being considered. Such a development would, however, mean stronger 
competition with other onshore Russian resources, notably the Yamal peninsula. 
And the raison d’être for developing Shtokman has been its strategic location as 
an LNG source. Shtokman gas is commonly considered more expensive to develop 
than other possible sources for the integrated Russian pipeline network. On the 
other hand, Shtokman could relieve some of the pressure on Gazprom’s investment 
budget, since the foreign partners will help with financing as well as management 
of the project. Shtokman as a collaborative project could also perhaps play a role 
in reducing some of the tensions between Europe and Russia in the gas market.
There is no consensus on how the gas market will develop in the longer term. 
Gas optimists argue that the availability of vast new gas resources world-wide, 
but particularly in the United States, will change the attitude to this energy car-
rier, and make it the desired fuel for the longer term in many countries, thus 
increasing demand compared to earlier estimates. This development will in turn 
 support higher prices than what was experienced during and in the aftermath of 
the  financial crisis. These are also considerations in the discussion of the start up 
of a long-term project like Shtokman.
The unconventional gas ‘revolution’ is a challenge, not only for Shtokman but 
also for other Arctic gas projects, including on the Norwegian continental shelf. 
It is probable that the petroleum industry for some time will be much more inter-
ested in oil than gas discoveries.
The Shtokman process nevertheless remains a big experiment in co-operation 
– whether development goes ahead or not. There clearly is scope for more techni-
51.  For a discussion of the impact on gas markets from the expected surge in unconventional gas 
production, see IEA World Energy Outlook, OECD/IEA, Paris 2009.
52.  Gazprom press release, 5 February 2010.
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cal and commercial co-operation on the Russian continental shelf, but it is up to 
Russia to release that potential.
Norway and Russia have successfully managed the major fish stocks in the 
Barents Sea in co-operation for more than thirty years. Norwegian authorities 
have in recent years been eager to co-operate with Russia on standards for envi-
ronmental and resource management. Here developments are slow, but positive 
from the Norwegian authorities’ point of view.
Despite the delimitation dispute in the Barents Sea and disagreement about 
the status of the continental shelf around the Svalbard archipelago, the relation-
ship between Russia and Norway in the energy sphere has been peaceful and 
 co- operative. Neither side allowed the disagreement to spill over into areas where 
there is potential for co-operation. One possible interpretation of the Russian will-
ingness to come to an agreement is that the resolved delimitation dispute improves 
the atmosphere further, at the same time as it gives Russia access to a promising 
area. An improved atmosphere is one requirement, but only one, if Russia wants 
to change its offshore development strategy and offer attractive conditions for 
foreign participants, not only Norwegian. Should Russia develop such a strategy, 
international petroleum companies may start to compare prospects in the western 
and eastern parts of the Barents Sea.
In the shorter term on the bilateral level, the agreement will serve as inspiration 
for development of co-operation in many spheres, even in the event of a setback 
in the Shtokman project.
Arild Moe is Deputy Director at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute in Oslo. He has written 
extensively on Russian energy politics.
Арилд Му / Arild Moe
Норвегия и Россия перемещают нефтегазовую деятельность в воды Барен-
цева моря. Активность норвежцев характеризуется деятельностью промыш-
ленности, заинтересованной в работах, но при этом готовой остановиться. 
Другой чертой является поддержка властей, которые одновременно накла-
дывают серьезные ограничения на деятельность. Россия до сих пор не имеет 
последовательной политики касающейся работ в открытом море. Приори-
тет государственных целей остается нерешенным, остается неочевидным и 
принцип разделения функций между государственными органами и государ-
ственными компаниями. Частные и иностранные интересы удерживаются 
на расстоянии. Сохраняется и неопределенность касательно как времени и 
места разработки месторождений, так и относительно концепции развития 
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в целом. Отношения между Россией и Норвегией в сфере энергетики всегда 
были мирными и направленными на сотрудничество, несмотря на юридиче-
ские разногласия в Баренцевом море. Договор по установлению границ зна-
чительно улучшает ситуацию, и означает, что потенциальные территории 
могут быть открыты для нефтегазовой активности, и, возможно, совместной 
работы по освоению месторождений, находящихся на новой границе.
